Between Saying and Showing: The Limits of Language and the Problem of Expression in Wittgenstein and Sufi Shathahāt

Abstract

This paper examines the problem of the limits of language through a comparative analysis of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Sufi tradition of shathahāt (ecstatic utterances). In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein famously distinguishes between what can be said and what can only be shown, thereby establishing a boundary beyond which language fails to express meaning. This study argues that Sufi shathahāt, as found in figures such as Al-Hallaj and Bayazid Bastami, do not simply violate this boundary but instead transform it. Rather than demonstrating the impossibility of expressing the ineffable, shathahāt employ symbolic, paradoxical, and analogical language to articulate meanings that cannot be fully captured by propositional discourse. By bringing these two traditions into dialogue, the paper proposes a rethinking of the “unsayable”: not as that which lies entirely beyond language, but as that which can be expressed without being exhausted. This approach challenges the rigid dichotomy between saying and showing, suggesting instead a spectrum of expression in which language operates at its limits. The study contributes to contemporary discussions in Filsafat Bahasa and Filsafat Agama by offering a cross-cultural perspective on the relationship between language, meaning, and transcendence.